Removing the dagger

An interview with Task Force Zamboanga commander, Col Alexander Yano by Frencie L. Carreon
(As reprinted from Zamboanga Today dated 14 April 2002)
It was shortly before 7 in the morning and my phone rang. The ringtone was enough to tell me the caller was a friend, and a military officer. With eyes half-closed and after a sleepy "hello", the voice on the other end said, "Frencie, I just read today's issue of Zamboanga Today, and your interview with the MNLF negotiators."
Startled, I opened my eyes and stared at the screen. It was Task Force Zamboanga commander Col Alexander B Yano.
Apparently, there was another side to that story on the November 27, 2001 drama. The hostages' versions were aired and published from time to time, and only once has the Moro National Liberation Front negotiators spoken (through Zamboanga Today). Finally, Task Force Zamboanga gives the full picture.
Zamboanga Today: Critics have assailed the military's position in letting the MNLF renegade soldiers go following the November 27 to 29 crisis in Cabatangan Complex and Pasonanca. How would you react to this?
YANO: The military approach was not the sole overriding consideration in that crisis. As the direct ground tactical commander then, I could not just brush aside heavy socio-political underpinnings of that unfolding scenario. Although I was not privy to the negotiations that took place, they were greatly instrumental in the early and acceptable resolution of that crisis.
Zamboanga Today: Were you really poised to attack the LTP-MNLF position as some quarters claimed?
YANO: The MNLF forces in Cabatangan were not enemies at the start. Such status was accorded to them by the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement, which was signed on September 2, 1996. But the concerns regarding the MNLF in the Cabatangan property, which is now contested government estate that is actually belonging to the national government, have always been there since the area was converted into a de facto ARMM satellite office. It has served a waypoint for MNLF regulars who came to Zamboanga from the provinces of Basilan and Sulu. These regulars often carried firearms that were concealed within their persons or in luggage. With the peace agreement in force, law enforcement officers were very careful in subjecting them to strict inspection in apprehension of insulting their sensibilities. But then, the security concerns were always there.
So, unlike the Abu Sayyaf, the AFP could not just bomb and obliterate them outright. The situation then was a politically delicate one.
Zamboanga Today: What was your game plan, then?
YANO: Based on guidance from my direct superiors (Southern Command chief Lt. Gen Roy Cimatu and BGen Glecerio Sua,) I decided that my mission initially was more of containment. And so, with the limited forces available to me, I deployed them strategically and close enough to contain the MNLF renegades and their activities in the complex itself, but far enough also to avoid triggering premature armed confrontation between the two contending forces. We did not want to convert urban Zamboanga into a battleground. Striking that delicate balance on the ground required enough sense or even gut feel. You could not reduce troops deployment into specific distances and locations. Logically, in positioning my forces a little farther from the threat, we run the risk of MNLF escape or exit. We did not cordon nor seal off every inch of the ground around the Cabatangan complex as some sectors sarcastically blamed after the fact. For one, we did not have the luxury or availability of forces to do that. During this standoff situation, negotiations were also underway or the peaceful MNLF withdrawal from the Cabatangan complex. Unfortunately, at dawn of November 27th, the renegades left their Cabatangan perimeter and moved towards the positions of government troops at the vicinity of Don Lorenzo Memorial High School along Gov Ramos Avenue. That hostile move from Julhambri Misuari's men triggered the firefights between AFP and MNLF forces and the subsequent two-day crisis. The government troops did not start any offensive action contrary to some irresponsible media reports.
Zamboanga Today: But prior to November 27, a lot of text messages were passed around regarding the presence of heavily armed men near the area. This actually added to the alarm among the civilian populace.
YANO: Yes, but you also have to include in the picture the simultaneous attacks on the 104th Brigade and other AFP units in Sulu by the MNLF breakaway forces on November 19. This caused tension in Zamboanga City, particularly the Cabatangan complex, where the ARMM satellite office is. There were intelligence reports indicating infiltration and exfiltration of MNLF forces in Cabatangan. Added to this, there were civilian residents around the complex who have aired harassment complaints and other abuses by the MNLF breakaway forces.
Zamboanga Today: And that pushed Task Force Zamboanga to act then?
YANO: Yes, these MNLF actions were what prompted Task Force Zamboanga to immediately deploy troops to contain MNLF forces in the complex. Now, the aim of the containment operations was not to immediately fire at the enemy line, but to apply calibrated pressure on the MNLF renegades then guarding the complex, enough to limit their activities in the area. It was but short of an all-out military offensive. You know, a purely military option could have far-reaching implications in Zamboanga then and may even cause sympathetic reactions from Muslim communities. You can never tell.
Zamboanga Today: What were the results of the operations in terms of casualties, recoveries, and the like?
YANO: Well, TFZ had 2 casualties, and one enlisted personnel was hit by sniper fire while monitoring the hostages at Fairview Subdivision. The 59th IB had two wounded men when the MNLF forces attacked them somewhere in Don Pablo Lorenzo Memorial High School. The 57th IB had two enlisted personnel who were wounded in the encounter while moving towards the area in Cabatangan complex. Then somewhere in kilometer 4 along Pasonanca Road, 3 enlisted of the 20th Scout Ranger Company were killed in action at an encounter with an undetermined number of MNLF renegade soldiers while positioning to contain the MNLF in Pasonanca. While conducting paneling or bomb search towards Cabatangan complex, 1 enlisted man of the K-9 unit of the 3rd EOD was wounded. And finally, during the encounter with about ten MNLF forces, 1 soldier was wounded while securing evacuees somewhere in Cabatangan complex. On the enemy side, we have a report of 20 casualties based on body count, and 25 were captured or apprehended. We had an estimated number of 15,000 evacuees, 106 hostages, 19 wounded civilians. There were about 15 high-powered firearms and two low-powered firearms recovered. There were many other items recovered actually.
Zamboanga Today: From the military point of view, how would you assess the outcome of that Cabatangan operations?
YANO: As one of the direct participants in that conflict resolution exercise, it would be self-serving for me to evaluate its outcome. It would, however, be best to view such from a total perspective.
The operations dislodged the MNLF renegades from their sanctuary or base in Zamboanga City. It must be noted that the complex was used not as an administrative satellite office but a virtual fortress.
Recovered from the place were several explosives and bomb components and weapons of destructions obviously meant to kill or maim people or destroy properties. Why were they in the LTP complex? What were they for? The complex then, was practically off-limits to people other MNLF members. Surprisingly, a few days after Cabatangan was occupied by AFP troops, local city officials, including councilors, were too excited to see the place. Ironically, they have not been to the complex since the MNLF set foot thereat. Now, with the complex in government hands, the MNLF renegades were deprived of a safe base of operations in Zamboanga City from where they could launch terroristic activities. Before, even criminal elements and dubious characters could run to the complex and escape from justice.
While the hostage-taking incident was very unfortunate, the hostages were released unharmed and all accounted for in a few hours. The renegades badly needed human shields to assure their freedom. Given the situation, the outcome was a win-win solution to the problem.
Innocent lives were spared and collateral damages were almost nil.
Zamboanga Today: As the unit responsible for the defense of the city, would say that Zamboanga is now cleared of the problem over MNLF breakaway forces?
YANO: While the clearing of Cabatangan had considerable improved the security situation in Zamboanga, the terrorist problem still looms in our midst and is far from over. True, we have removed the dagger precariously pointed at the heart of the city with the MNLF renegades removed from that complex. But, TFZ has to remain vigilant and has to continue with its counter-terrorism efforts. We cannot afford to lower our guards. The proactive actions consisting of our patrols, checkpoints and intelligence monitoring are still very much actively being conducted.
Col Alexander Yano has been at the helm of Task Force Zamboanga for the past eleven months, having assumed command of the unit on June 1, 2001. This coincided with the onset of AFP operations against the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan, following the May 27 Dos Palmas kidnapping.
Accordingly, he received the post without any formal turn-over ceremony as customary in the military. The outgoing commander then, Col Jovenal Narcise, had to return to Basilan on the morning of June 1 to supervise the armed encounter in Tuburan between the Abu Sayyaf hostage-takers and the AFP troops under the 103rd Brigade of the Philippine Army.
Prior to his designation as TFZ commander, he was Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, G3 of the Philippine Army in Fort Bonifacio, then servicing a primary staff adviser to the Army Chief on matters pertaining to field operations of the entire Army. Earlier, he served for two years with the Presidential Security Group (PSG) as Chief of Staff and later in concurrent capacity as Deputy Commander.
He is an alumnus of the Philippine Military Academy belonging to Class '76. (Frencie L. Carreon)